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assistance.I.  INTRODUCTION
'Since  the writings of John Stuart Mill, an illustrious group of economists have
argued either that finance is unimportant or that it matters most when it gets out of
order.  As evidence of its neglect, generations of economists constructed models
without money or a financial sector, and development texts, though routinely
mentioning savings and investment, did not feature chapters on the financial
system.'  With the explosion of banking crises around the globe in the last two
decades of the 20th century, finance is back in fashion.  The turbulence and
spread of financial crises in the East Asian 'miracle'  economies -- and in Japan --
has raised concerns about the stability of financial systems in many countries, as
well as inquiries as to the lessons of this experience. Authorities around the world
are concerned about financial crises: how do they happen, why are there more and
more costly crises, and what steps can be taken to minimize vulnerability.
This paper will address these issues.  Section II will summarize briefly the
voluminous literature on proxiMate and more distant causes of crises.  Although
both micro and macro factors are associated with crises, beyond lobbying for
c:hanges  in the international financial system, national authorities are left with
following sound macro policies, improving financial sector infrastructure, and
upgrading regulation and supervision as means of minimizing the likelihood and2
costs of financial crises.  Is there a payoff to improving the regulatory framework?
Tentative evidence presented in section III, which compares the broad regulatory
environment in 12 selected Asian and Latin American countries, suggests that the
answer is affirmative.  This comparison both reveals how some countries have
been progressing, in some cases beyond the BIS minimum standards, and can help
as a guide, indicating weak areas of regulation that should be a target for further
improvement.  Generally, those countries that have higher scores on their
regulatory systems appear to have weathered the latest crisis well, suggesting that
improving the regulatory environment, broadly interpreted, should be a goal for
countries that have not thus far made much headway in this area.  The
predominance of Asian countries at the bottom of the regulatory ranking (and the
jump in interest rates there) provides another explanation of the mostly regional
focus of the latest crisis.  An added advantage of this scoring system is that it
offers a game plan for the authorities in improving the regulatory environment.
A plausible hypothesis then is that authorities are learning -- at great cost -
- from the last 2 decades of crises and are moving to raise the cost or otherwise
tighten the safety net supporting the banking sector.  Section IV will conclude
with unresolved issues and suggestions for future research.3
II. CRISES: CAUSES NEAR AND FAR
"Panics do not destroy capital; they merely reveal the extent to which it
has  been  previously destroyed  by  its  betrayal  into  hopelessly
unproductive  works."  John Stuart  Mill, 1867.
The literature on banking crises has grown exponentially with the boom in bust
banks in recent years.  Indeed, the Asian crisis has spawned several websites, one
of which lists, as of June 3, 1998, 43 pages of citations of research papers, country
reports, news, and other websites with related information.2 This section, after
clarifying what we mean by crisis, briefly reviews some of the latest contribution
to the literature on proximate causes of financial (here, mostly banking) crises,
before turning to some of the fundamental causes.  Understanding the proximate
causes may help with predicting crises, but an understanding of the fundamental
factors is necessary to help with their prevention.
Any review of the 'crisis'  literature should commence with the warning
that not all of the crises discussed are the same; a key issue thus is what
constitutes a crisis.  In the last few years, as economists have tried to model crises,
there has been a tendency to distinguish two types: currency crises and financial
crises.  The former involve-a sudden movement of the exchange rate and sharp
change in capital flows. Financial crises regularly originate in or induce
insolvency in the banking system, and feature a collapse in asset prices, most
often in equity and securities markets.  Banking system insolvency has various4
manifestations, such as a run on the banks, large bailout programs or bank
nationalization (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997) or a large nonperforming
loan problem (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1997).
Still, these categorizations require some judgment for determining when a
country is in a crisis of either type.3 Either of these crises may be mild or severe. .
But a financial crisis usually involves a corporate debt problem in the nonbank
financial sector -- in other words, banks and other intermediaries usually do not
get into trouble if borrowers can easily service their debt. Financial crises can
occur without any currency crisis, as witnessed in many cases in Africa and in
transition countries (though the crisis here, when no run was involved, was rather
the insolvency of the banking system). Mild currency crises usually involve
neither a corporate debt problem nor a banking crisis, as in the case of the 1992
ERM episode, whereas severe currency crises usually do trigger one or both.
That is, severe currency crises usually entail a crisis in the banking and nonbank
sectors.
This paper focuses on financial crises, regardless of whether a currency
crisis is deemed to be involved. 4 A search for causes can be divided along two
lines: more proximate causes, in the sense that they may provide indicators of
incipient crises, and more distant, or fundamental factors. Demirguc-Kunt and
Detragiache (1997, 1998) look at determinants in the former sense, using a5
multivariate logit analysis of the likelihood of a banking crisis, based on the
following indicators:
*  macro (GDP growth, change in terms of trade, real interest rate, inflation,
depreciation of the exchange rate, and government surplus/GDP);
*  financial (M2/ foreign exchange reserves, credit growth/GDP, bank cash/bank
assets, and private credit/GDP);' and
*  institutional indicators (GDP per capita, the presence or absence of explicit
deposit insurance, and in index of law and order, which is a proxy for the
ability to enforce contracts).
This model, originally estimated up to 1994, performs quite well in prediction,
explaining about 70% of the crises that occurred, and within sample only
predicting a crisis when none occurred in 15% of the cases.  Interestingly, in their
research thus far, exchange rates or the terms of trade are not that significant in
most specifications, though their original data did not include the Mexican and
Asian crises.  Slower output growth, increases in real interest rates, declining
liquidity, faster credit growth, explicit deposit insurance, poor legal systems, and
low per capita GDP are found to be associated with a greater likelihood of
banking crises.
Previous research had debated whether macro or micro and institutional
factors 'caused'  banking crises, and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache reveal that
both play a role in the drama, consistent with the finding of Caprio and Klingebiel6
(1997) that out of 80 cases, both macro and micro factors regularly were cited as
causes of systemic crises.6 More recent attempts to explain crises have focused
on the Asian episodes, which stand out in a number of respects, not least because
the countries most directly involved -- Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea -- for
several decades had seen such rapid growth of real incomes and living standards,
and all appeared to have relatively favorable macro indicators, especially low
inflation, fiscal balance or surpluses, and exceptionally high savings rates.7
Krugman (1998) focuses on the links between moral hazard and overinvestment:
implicit guarantees that governments would stand behind financial intermediaries
led to investment based not on expected returns but on those likely in a
'Panglossian'  state (best of all possible worlds).  Cronyism, here interpreted to be
close links between the government and the owner/managers of intermediaries, is
featured in this explanation. Although applied to E. Asia in the 1  990s, this
description fits a number of other financial crises, including the U.S. Thrift
institutions in the 1980s and, as Brad De Long has pointed out, the 1873 U.S.
financial crisis (DeLong, 1998).
McKinnon and Pill (1997, 1998) highlight the other side of this
relationship, overborrowing, which occurs when the non-bank private sector
becomes "...euphoric or triumphalist about the success of reform because of the
overly optimistic implicit signal about macroeconomic developments contained in
loose credit decisions (McKinnon and Pill, 1998, p. 14)." Both these explanations7
are reminiscent of the debt-deflation literature (Fisher, 1936, Kindleberger, 1988,
Minsky, 1982, and Bernanke, 1983), and in the East Asian context apply with
particular force to Korea, which had debt-equity ratios in 1997 of 3, 4 or higher,
depending on when measured, well above those of OECD countries.  With such
high ratios, firms are vulnerable to the slightest downturn in earnings, since most
earnings are committed to paying interest on their debt.8
Certainly either version rings true.  Excessively high leverage, a reliance
on short-term debt, and property market bubbles were featured in E. Asia.  Private
credit grew substantially in excess of GDP throughout the 1990s, which is
consistent with this hypothesis, but as Corsetti et al (1998) note, this explanation
fits Thailand better than Korea and Indonesia. In Korea debt-equity ratios had
been excessive for some time, making it difficult to highlight a period of
demonstrably excessive growth.  Consistent with (and encouraged by) the real
exchange rate appreciation of their currencies, there was a sharp increase in
investment in non-traded goods, especially construction.  By 1997, it became
clear that much of the new office space -- in Bangkok and Jakarta, capacity
reached 5-8 times the level of the early 1990s -- was a misallocation of resourses.
Indeed, the property boom appears to have collapsed well in advance of any
foreign exchange panic, as property indexes on the stock exchange by the end of
1996 were off their peaks of 1993 in Indonesia (by about one-third) and Thailand8
(by three-quarters).  Property booms, of varying magnitudes, figured prominently
in the Scandinavian, U.S., and Japanese crises, among others.
Radelet and Sachs (1998), again on the Asian crisis, argue that the panic
by foreign investors caused the crisis, but given the warning signs of problems in
the financial sector, including the declining property market, it is more likely that
the panic exacerbated the problem.  In other words, John Stuart Mill (above) was
only partly right: panics both reveal pre-existing resource misallocation and, to
the extent that asset markets overshoot, can significantly deepen the crisis as well.
Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998) argue that the crisis occurred because
investors became aware of the fundamental problems about banking and corporate
debt. In this regard, Bumside et al (1998) develop a model in which a currency
crisis can be caused by foreigners awakening to the fiscal costs of the financial
sector crisis; that is, even if stated fiscal positions are in balance or surplus, the
actual position, when there are large contingent liabilities of the banking sector,
can be in large deficit.  This approach admits the possibility of self-fulfilling
crises: if the market decides that banks are weak and run the currency, banks with
direct (on balance sheet) or indirect foreign exchange exposure (on their
customers' balance sheets) can be rendered insolvent. Thus a panic by investors
might be rational or irrational.  In addition, the Asian crisis featured a number of
policy errors that compounded what might have been a smaller crisis (Corsetti, et
al.).9
Lastly, not just related to East Asia but on financial crises more generally,
Stiglitz (1998) and Demirguc-Kunt-Detragiache (1998) note the role played by
premature financial sector liberalization, especially where existing institutions --
regulation, supervision, and other parts of the infrastructure that would support
incentive-compatible behavior -- are absent. This view stresses the need for
sensible pacing and sequencing of financial reforms.
MORE FUNDAMENTAL  FACTORS BEHIND  CRISES
The debate among most of the aforementioned authors on the prime cause of the
crisis is interesting, but those searching for a single cause of crises miss or at least
de-emphasize, a key point, namely that multiple factors were featured most of the
time.  Thus, of the 86 episodes of bank insolvency (1980-94) in the Caprio-
Klingebiel dataset, at least 20 of these featured 'cronyism,' meaning excessive
political interference, connected lending, or similar labels, and at least 30 featured
overborrowing.  Panics by foreign investors played a role in Latin American
crises of the 1  980s and in East Asia in the 1990s, and premature liberalization
could be cited in virtually all cases.  And of course, macro factors are common
factors in bank insolvency, especially terms of trade declines or recessions.
But rather than emphasize these proximate factors, it is helpful to realize
that crises are manifestations of deeper characteristics of the financial sector,
vvhich  make it prone to such events. Indeed, as Rodrik (1998) has noted, it is10
distressing that whenever crises occur the economics profession tends to come up
with a new generation model to explain the events, only to find that the next crises
do not fit the model.  Focusing on more proximate factors makes this continual
chase almost inevitable.
Instead, it is useful to consider the fundamental characteristics of finance:
information asymmetries, intertemporal trade, and (some) demandable debt.
Providers of funds have difficulties monitoring intermediaries, who in turn face
the same problem with users of funds.  Those receiving funds know better how
they will utilize them than the providers, while the exchange of money today for
money in the future further complicates the monitoring problem.  This
information asymmetry affects bank owners, market participants -- depositors and
other creditors -- and bank supervisors. 9 Thus most bank loans are illiquid and
not easily marked to market, making banking, with demandable debt, especially
vulnerable to a revaluation of expectations and contributing to its inherent
fragility.' 10 Indeed, this feature of banking makes it particularly susceptible to
multiple equilibria.
Information asymmetries and intertemporal trade foster incentive
problems in finance.  Bank managers in a perfect information world would find it
more difficult to take risks in excess of shareholders' comfort level, and
supervisors could intervene in time if they always knew the true net worth of
banks."  Thus looting, gambling for resurrection or Ponzi schemes could not11
occur with perfect information and any reasonable form of corporate governance.
Informnation  and incentive problems worsen during the crisis itself, as markets
may not distinguish between better and worse banks, and asset prices, which may
have been inflated before the crisis, can overshoot their equilibrium level as
investors rush for the door.
While countries are in a 'good'  equilibrium, it is perhaps understandable
that authorities are not disposed to deal with the weaknesses in their financial
systems, even though this is likely the best time to do so,  Once the economy slips
into crisis -- the bad equilibrium -- it is likely easier to muster political support for
reform, though the long delays in responding in the United States and Japan,
among other countries, suggest that the process is neither automatic nor
necessarily rapid.
III. BANK REGULATION  AND OPERATING  ENVIRONMENT
In response to the wave of banking crises of the last two decades, authorities in
some countries have begun raising the cost and limiting the extent of the safety
net supplied to banks.  Enacting and tightening the regulations that banks confront
is a key way to achieve this goal, and cross-country comparisons of bank
regulation can help reveal the relative strengths and weakness of the operating
environment for banks, as well as keep track of progress made in this respect.  Yet12
it is difficult to compare regulatory environments, much less the way in which the
regulations are supervised.  This section attempts the former task, comparing bank
regulation, adapted from the CAMEL framework employed by bank supervisors,
variations of which have been used for this purpose by JP Morgan (1997) and
Ramos (1997) precisely for rating regulations.  1
2 Just as individual banks can be
assessed by their capital, asset quality, management, earnings, and liquidity,
regulatory systems can be compared by using similar criteria, assessing not how
these measures compare for all the banks in a country, but rather how the
country's  requirements and overall environment compares with those of others.
Unfortunately, data needed to do these assessments were readily available only
for a dozen E. Asian and Latin American countries, but a current World Bank
research project is extending this information to a wider variety of countries and
also quantifying some supervisory variables.
Capital here is assessed here by the minimum required capital-asset ratio,
as well as its definition; the more restrictive the allowances for recognizing asset
revaluations as part of capital, or the more that risk taking is explicitly accounted
for in constituting minimum ratios, the higher the ranking. Asset quality is
proxied by the definition of non-performing loans -- the number of days till a loan
becomes nonperforming -- and the provisioning required once this judgment is
made.  Management quality is the most difficult to compare, but the arbitrary
assumption made here is that countries with more assets in foreign banks enjoy13
better managed assets; foreign ownership also brings better diversification.
Management quality could be regarded as separate from regulation, but is
included in an index of the regulatory environment as indicating the types of
owners that are allowed into the industry. 13 Earnings are not included, as they
relate only partly to regulations or the environment, but more to cyclical
considerations (as well as to accounting conventions). Minimum liquidity
requirements, the inclusion of foreign exchange as a separate reason for liquidity,
and the extent of its remuneration are included in the liquidity indicator. 14
The environment in which banks function is affected by their operating
environment and the degree of transparency, which here are included as part of
the broad regulatory environment.  The overall operating environment is proxied
by measures of property rights (the poorer these are defined, the more difficult it
becomes to secure credit), creditors' rights, which indicate the ability of creditors
to secure repayment, and a measure of the enforcement of the laws (LaPorta et al,
1998, and Levine, 1998). Finally, transparency is perhaps the most difficult to
gauge.  The ranking here is based on whether bank ratings are required, the
number of top 10 banks with ratings from international firms (judged to be
superior in emerging markets to local counterparts and less susceptible to
corruption), and an index of corruption. The latter is included because the greater
the extent of corruption, the less likely it is that disclosed information will be
accurate.  l5 Appendix A contains the details behind each category.14
Several caveats are in order.  These measures are as of late 1997, before
most of the crisis countries made any significant changes in their regulations,
however, the components of the operating environment and the corruption index
(part of the transparency measure) are from the early 1  990s.  Since the latter
variables only change slowly, this lag is not likely be a significant drawback.
Most importantly, each category is equally weighted, clearly an arbitrary rule of
thumb.  Each category has its proponents: some argue that management is key,
others that loan classification and provisioning matters most, and in the wake of
the Asian crisis, transparency is receiving a much emphasis.  Or, proponents of
narrow evaluations of regulations alone would prefer to include only capital,
assets, and liquidity, which would change the rankings somewhat, as noted below.
Only further research, once a broader dataset is available, will possibly settle this
issue.  Although capital standards, liquidity ratios, and the share of (majority
owned) foreign banks in total assets admit to relatively straightforward
measurement, with some scope for interpretations of definitions, the other
variables are more difficult to measure.  Lastly, until data on or proxies for
supervisory effort become available, it is not possible to determine how the
regulations are enforced.  With these caveats, Table 1 shows the overall
'CAMELOT'  rankings, with lower numbers indicating a higher rating.
As indicated by the shadings, several clusters of economies stand out, with
Singapore showing the strongest regulatory environment, followed in the order15
shown in the Table.  The groupings are highlighted due to the close scores in
several categories and because it is unlikely that differences in total scores of a
few points will be significant. Also, the rankings may understate the present
health of various systems; for example, in Hong Kong, official regulations do not
require a given amount of provisioning even once a loan is in arrears by 180 days
(hence a lower score here), yet the authorities encourage provisioning, and Hong
Kong Shanghai Bank, a very large part of the 'Hong Kong' banking system, may
have much stricter standards and a first-rate market and credit risk management
system.  Still, the comparison in Table 1 is on bank regulation systems, which
may only correspond to the health of the banks in the long run.  Also, note that
some countries, such as Peru, the Philippines and Colombia, score quite well on
narrow CAMEL criteria, but have a lower ranking due to their relatively lower
scores on the operating environment and transparency.
These regulatory environment rankings are potentially useful for several
purposes.  First, for the authorities in each country they show areas in which
improvements are more important.  For example, authorities in the Philippines
might find efforts to improve the legal system and transparency, where they have
a low score, to be of higher priority than encouraging more foreign bank entry, the
latter already being a strength. And Colombian authorities apparently do not need
to make improvements in capital or loan classification, but other criteria would
appear to need attention.  Again, however, it is important to note that these16
recommendations assume that further research -- only possible once a broader
database is available -- bears out the importance of these criteria.  Also, the
ratings should not be used as simple 'minimum standards,' in that they are no
substitute for the commitment of the political and financial elite of a country to
avoid the costs of bad banking. Rather, these ratings could be used as a tool by an
already committed elite to effect change in their banking system.
Second, it should be no surprise when economies with low scores are hit
by crises.  Those at the top or middle of the range in Table 1, which may have
tighter regulations either because they experienced crises in the 1980s (Argentina,
Chile, Hong Kong) or due to concerns about the vulnerability associated with
being small, highly open economies (Hong Kong, Singapore), tend to have been
less affected by the recent crisis.  By early 1998, interest rates in a variety of
emerging markets had risen significantly (Table 2), as did the rates at which they
borrowed in international markets.  As seen in Figure 1, domestic interest rates
between the end of 1996 and the spring of 1998 have widened most for economies
with the weakest (that is, highest) regulatory scores, though to be sure with only a
dozen observations the sample is insufficient for more formal testing." 6 Still, an
evaluation of bank regulation may help in understanding the vulnerabilities of
financial systems.  Strengthening the regulatory environment likely pays off: thus,
Argentina was more seriously affected in the wake of the Tequila crisis than by
the Asian 'flu,' having in the meantime substantially strengthened capital17
regulations and loan classification procedures, allowed the percentage of foreign
banks to rise significantly, and markedly improved transparency.
Third, in the emerging debate on' contagion, some effort is being devoted
to explaining why the Mexican and Asian crises appeared to be largely regional.
This literature almost exclusively focuses on 'real'  sector explanations (Diwan
and Hoekman, 1998; Glick and Rose, 1998), an approach that fits particularly
well in Asia, where trade links are larger than in other emerging market regions.
Another explanation, by no means mutually exclusive, is that shocks or
dislocations come along regularly, and those countries that are the most
susceptible to a significant financial crisis are those in which the incentive and
information systems are the weakest.  This view also helps explain why Singapore
and Hong Kong, both with strong real sector links in -the E. Asian region, were
less affected by the crisis.
IV. CRISIS  LESSONS
What lessons can be learned from the crises of the last two decades?  The main
candidates for explaining the boom in bank failures and the unprecedented fiscal
cost of these episodes are that:
*  with the demise of colonialism and rise of nation-states, there has been more
local banking -- more countries attempting to have banks that specialize in18
lending to the home market, leading to greater bank fragility and more banks
to fail;
*  macro volatility, post-Bretton-Woods, has increased or shocks are transmitted
more readily; andlor
*  government safety nets are encouraging greater moral hazard, without
commensurate improvements in the information and incentive environment.
Although the first factor likely matters, it is not plausible that it alone explains the
phenomenal surge in systemic banking problems.  Also, while it is evident that
interest rate and exchange rate volatility and capital mobility are greater in the
1980s and 1990s than during the Bretton Woods period, the same statement
would not be true for a comparison with the nineteenth and early twentieth
century, particularly if real interest rates and real GDP volatility were compared.
Moreover, the work of Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache shows that macro factors
alone do not explain banking crises.  Thus the third factor likely plays an
important role in this story.
Correcting information and incentive problems then stands out as a key
area for national authorities' attention, and some tentative evidence was presented
suggesting that those economies with the most conservative regulatory
environment have best weathered crises.  Once more systematic information is
available to score a wider variety of regulatory and supervisory systems, this
tentative evidence can be subjected to more formal econometric testing.19
Although improving information should be a clear goal, authorities need to realize
that they will never eliminate information asymmetries -- or financial crises!
Even the best information environments have banking crises -- notwithstanding
the views of some Texans,-  this state in the 1980s was part of the United States,
and shared its accounting, auditing, and corporate governance systems.
Given the nature of information problems, having bank surveillance by
'multiple eyes'  is a recommended approach, meaning that owners, markets, and
supervisors all need to be given clear incentives and information to monitor
banks.  Merely increasing capital ratios in the hope that it will induce better bank
performance may not be successful: the quality of bank capital, and of bank
balance sheets, is difficult to monitor, and higher required capital ratios could
induce more risk taking (Hellmann, Murdoch, and Stiglitz, 1997, and Berger et al,
1995). In Argentina, the required capital ratio most clearly is a function of the
risks being taken: banks are required to have higher minimum ratios the lower
their individual CAMEL rating, the more they lend in excess of 200 basis points
above prime rates, and the greater the market risks they undertake.  Also, with the
requirement that banks issue subordinated debt, there is now the ability to use
both market and supervisory input in making decisions as to their riskiness.
Moving to forward-looking risk models as a way to ensure better behavior among
bankers should be effective but only if significant penalties are assessed when
bankers violate the assumptions of their risk models.  Making sure that there are20
some uninsured debt holders in the market will help with monitoring from this
source.
Owners of banks also can be motivated by increasing their franchise value,
such as through limiting entry. Both U.S. and Japanese banks got into difficulties
after several decades of declining franchise value (Weisbrod, Lee, and Rojas-
Suarez, 1993; Keeley, 1990). But enforcing entry limits will be difficult in higher
income economies given that nonbanks can start up banking functions at low cost.
Lastly, supervisors also need incentives.  In many countries there are
disincentives to monitor when: supervisory agencies have little political
independence, pay is a fraction of that in the industry being supervised,
supervisors face personal legal liability for their official actions, and former
supervisors are allowed to take jobs in banking, in effect raising the possibility
that they enjoy deferred compensation for not doing their job well.  Calomiris
(1997) has documented well examples from the nineteenth century, when deferred
compensation for supervisors was used to induce effective supervision, and Kane
(1997) actively makes a case for a 'bonded regulator,' arguing that least-cost
supervision will not be attained until supervisors are given better incentives.
Governments are not moving significantly on this last point, but instead
there is growing support for requiring 'prompt, corrective action' as a way to
ensure that supervisors act in a timely fashion.  Unfortunately, these rules can be
re-written in times of crisis (Caprio, 1997), and whether such rules are more or21
less likely to be overturned than a bonded regulator is an unresolved issue.  Still,
the fact that a number of both high and middle income countries are making
improvements in the information and incentive environment in banking suggests,
that after some of the costliest financial crises in history, authorities are learning.
To the extent that authorities raise the cost or limit the coverage of the safety net
for banking, fewer banking crises may be expected. However, with a more
limited or more expensive safety net, the nonbank industry will grow rapidly, as it
has in Argentina in the last 2 years, in part to escape the costs.
As the Thai authorities discovered most recently, nonbank finance
company problems can infect the banking sector, and a cardinal rule of financial
regulation should be that all institutions that take deposits and make loans,
regardless of what they are called, should be regulated as banks.  The challenge
for authorities, then, will be to ensure that financial intermediation, wherever it
occurs, is well (not over-) regulated.  With an improved regulatory environment,
governments can more realistically expect that financial intermediation will be
more likely to absorb, rather than magnify, shocks.22
Appendix A.  Components of the CAMELOT Ratings for Banking System
Regulation.1
Capital
Country  Definition  Minimum  Ranking
Ratio
Singapore  Only  Tier I eligible  12  1
Argentina  Capital  ratio geared  to CAMEL  rating  and interest  rates;  capital  11.5  1
req. for market  risk added,  with  bonds  of duration  over 2.5  years
requiring  higher  capital
Hong Kong  70% of revaluation  reserves  eligible  for inclusion.  Minimum  can  8  3
be raised  up to 12%  for licensed  banks,  16%  for restricted  license
or deposit-taking  company;  institutions  required  to observe  a
'trigger' 1%  above  the minimum. Capital  requirement  for market
risk as of late-97.
Chile  Only  LT sub  debt,  up to 20% of capital;  risk  weight  for mortgages  8  5
above  Basle  norm.
Brazil  Reval.  reserves,  loss  reserves,  included  tier 2  8  7
Peru  No revaluation  accounts,  sub. debt  permitted;  min. capital  ratio  8  5
raised  by 150-200%  for  overdue  loans.
Malaysia  Only  tier I in 8%  8  5
Colombia  150  % risk weight  for loans,  only  50% of revaluation  assets.  9  3
Korea  Up to 45% of revaluation  gains included  in tier 2 capital  8  7
Philippines  No tier 2, unweighted  (all at 100%)  10  4
Thailand  Tier 2 includes  revaluation  accounts,  provisions,  unrealized  8.5  7
securities  profit/loss,  subordinated  debt
Indonesia  Sub.  debt up to 50%,  8  7
Loan Classification
Country  Days to NPL  Min. initial  Comments  Ranking
status  provision*
Singapore  sub. risk  loan  value-  6
.8*collateral  (50%
min.)
Argentina  90  25%  1% provision on  4
normal  loans,
- Max. single,  15%
Hong Kong  180  no general  rule  Max. single,  25%  9
Chile  30/90  600/on.a.  I
Brazil  60  100  3
Peru  60/90  50-60%  2
Malaysia  180  0/1% gen.  provisions  9
Colombia  90  50%  4
Korea  180  20%  9
Philippines  sub. risk  25%  6
Thailand  360  15%  11
Indonesia  90  10%  8
* On unsecured balances.23
Management  (Foreign  Ownership)
Country  % of assets  in  Rank
foreign banks
Sinlgapore  61.6  2
Argentina  42.9  3
Hong Kong  65.6  1
Chile  33.1  4
Brazil  33.6  4
Pera  28.0  6
Malaysia  14.6  8
Colombia  5.3  11
Korea  8.0  10
Philippines  15.0  7
Thailand  1.8  12
Indonesia  10.8  9
Liquidity
Country  Ratio(s)  Forex  Remuneration  Ranking
Singapore  24%  Watched  closely  5
Argentina  20% on liabilities  up to 89  Watched  closely  Mostly  4
days, 15%  for 90-179;  10%  for  remunerated,
180-365;  and 0 for over  365  half  offshore
days.  Approx.  9.7% additional
as Repos.
Hong Kong  25% of liabilities  Watched  closely  Mostly  2
remunerated
Chile  9% on demand,  3.6%  on time  8
Brazil  78/15/20  3
PeNM  9%  36%  added  Mostly  dollar  I
required  deposits,  so
45%
Malaysia  13.5%  No restrictions  8
Cclombia  21%, 10%  6
Korea  5% on demand,  2% on time  It
Philippines  13%  7
Thiailand  7%  8
Indonesia  3%  1224
Note that in ranking for operating environment, those with a "1" on property rights, get
ranked first (hence a 4-way tie); those with a 2.5 get a 5 (2-way tie), and those with a 2
come next, etc.  Creditors' rights are ranked in the same manner (except that ratings
range from a low of -2 to a high of 1, and enforcement of the legal system is ranked
linearly from the high of Singapore to the low of the Philippines.
Operating Environment
Country  Property  Creditor  Enforcement**  Ranking
Rights*  Rights**
Singapore  I  1  8.715  1
Argentina  2  -1  5.13  7
Hong Kong  I  1  8.52  2
Chile  I  -I  6.91  5
Brazil  3+  -2  6.31  8
Peru  3  -2  3.59  11
Malaysia  2  1  7.105  3
Colombia  3  -2  4.55  10
Korea  1  1  6.97  3
Philippines  2  -2  3.765  11
Thailand  2.5  1  6.91  6
Indonesia  2.5  1  5.035  8
* 1998 Index of Economic Freedom..
**  Levine (1997) and La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
For transparency, those countries requiring banks to be rated get a 1, those without this
requirement get a 0; the number of top 10 banks and the corruption measure are ranked as
above, and rankings then totaled in the same manner, with the lowest score getting a first
place, etc.
Transparency
Country  Bank Rating  Top 10 Banks with  Corruption**  Ranking
Required*  Int'l Ratings*
Singapore  No  All  8.22  1
Argentina  Yes  10  6.02  2
Hong Kong  No  3  8.52  4
Chile  Yes, 2  10  5.3  2
Brazil  No  9  6.32  5
Peru  Yes  6  4.7  10
Malaysia  No  2  7.38  8
Colombia  No  5  5.0  10
Korea  No  10  5.3  5
PhilippineS  No  8  2.92  12
Thailand  No  9  5.18  7
Indonesia  No  10  2.15  8
*BIS Annual Report, 1997, and World Bank data
** Laporta, et. al.25
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Table  1.  Summary  Measures  of the  Bank  Regulatory  Environment
Country  Total  Capital  Loan  Foreign  Liquidity  Operating  Transparency
Score  Position  Classification  Ownership  Environment
(Management)
Singapore  16  1  6  2  51  1
Argentina  21  1  4  3  4  7  2
Hong Kong  21  3  9  1  2  2  4
Chile  25  5  1  4  8  5  2
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Figure 1. Bank Regulatory Environment and Interest Rates
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ENDNOTES
l I am indebted to Ross Levine for the point on development texts.
2  The web page is Nouriel Roubini's at www.stem.nyu.edu/-nroubini/asia/AsiaHomepage.html.  Paul
Krugmnan,  in an observation on the extensive nature of this website, raised the question of whether Roubini
'had  a day job.'  For discussions of the Asian crisis, see in particular The World Bank, 1998; Krugman
1998, Goldstein,  1998, and Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, 1998.
3  That it, it is not clear what constitutes a 'sudden' move of the exchange rate, a sharp change in capital
flows, when a bank run is systemic (or merely represents a flow of deposits from weak banks to strong
ones), etc.
4In  the Kaminsky-Reinhart (1996) database, in 38 cases there was an exchange rate crisis without a
banking crisis.  The time from a banking crisis to an exchange rate crisis was minus (that is, the banking
crisis led the exchange rate crisis by) 5 years to plus six years (if one omits the plus 14-15 year cases!).
5 Since thus far there are no comparable data cross-country on domestic private debt or debt equity ratios,
the model could not include such indicators.
6 They found that terms of trade shocks, recessions, or credit booms, on the macro side, and deficient
management, faulty supervision and regulation, government intervention, or some degree of connected or
politically motivated lending, on the micro side, were cited as causes of most systemic crises.
Yet macro indicators were not uniformly strong. Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea all lost some
competitiveness from the Chinese devaluation of 1994 and the slide of the yen in 1996-97; by the end of
1996. the real exchange rate in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand had appreciated by 30-40% since the
early 1990s.  Thailand in particular kept its exchange rate fixed and interest rates above international levels
since the early 1990s; given the boom in domestic credit, only rising fiscal surpluses would have been
consistent with the pegged exchange rate.  The problem, of course, was that capital inflows continued
regardless of this inconsistency.
"  With high debt equity ratios, raising interest rates will only worsen insolvency.  The only solutions are:
injecting equity (unlikely in crisis environments), reducing the real value of debt through higher inflation,
or a debt-equity swap, which means wiping out existing equity holders and telling (some) debt holders that
they now have an equity claim.
9  Mishkin (1997) and Wyplosz (1998) elaborate on these information problems.
10 When a sufficient information becomes available on a firm so that its credit can be easily priced, the
firm graduates to direct market finance.  Information technology may reduce the cost of disseminating
information on firms, but small and medium-size frms  still rely on banks for most of their credit, even in
industrial economies.
"  In fact, with perfect inforrnation, there would be no need for supervision -- everyone would know what
risks banks were taking!
12  Note that this effort is distinguished from that of Morgan in including the operating environment and
transparency as part of the broad regulatory environment, and from Ramos in quantifying and ranking the
countries, as well as on the content of the various indicators.
13  There is no intention to suggest that authorities should admit more foreign banks regardless of the initial
conditions in banking and at a rapid pace, as foreign banks in some settings could be a source of instability.
There are solid banks in developing countries that are domestic banks.  But it is at least arguable that
foreign banks, the majority of which are from OECD countries, have better banking and in particular risk
management skills. Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga show that foreign bank entry leads to lower
profits and overheads for domestic banks, increases the stability of the financial system and promotes long
term growth. If this variable were dropped, it turns out that only the positions of Colombia and the
Philippines are reversed, and Thailand moves from 11th to tied for 10th place with the Philippines.
4  If liquidity requirements are not well-remunerated, then bankers will do their best to avoid them.
'5  Thus this ranking goes beyond what was attempted in Morgan (1997) and is more rigorous that Ramos
(1997).  A more thorough classification of financial sector regulation will be attempted in a World Bank
research project, which is just beginning, and which will be compiling more extensive information on how
financial systems are regulated and supervised.  Note, the LaPorta et al measure of accounting was not used
as no data were available for Indonesia, and the indicator for Argentina, which dated back to the early
1990s, is known to be out of date.32
16  Spreads on sovereign borrowing would be more informative but are not available for all these countries.
17  In addition to various national sources and those noted following various tables, sources included: JP
Morgan (1997), Ramos (Q997), Hong Kong Monetary Authority (1997) and IMF (1997).PA4Gey  N raln;h  W0rkiriNo wpbr  $eries
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